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2INTRODUCTION 
Recently, a professor of mine, who graduated from Harvard Law School ten years ago, 
told me she was the only one of her female friends from law school still working full time.  
Everyone else was raising children.  As a female law student, the conversation depressed me.  
After all, law school is expensive and difficult.  Apparently ten years later, this high-priced legal 
career is less valuable to most women than staying home with their children.   
The phenomenon is not limited to Harvard law school’s class of 1996.  In high skill job 
sectors nationwide, women are leaving the workplace in favor of child rearing.1 For the first 
time in history, women constitute a majority of secondary degree earners2, and yet the current 
data show an increasing number of high skill women abandoning their full-time professional 
lives.3 At the same time, high skill women are having fewer children than their low skill 
counterparts.4 This balance is untenable.  Investments of scarce economic and social resources 
are going to high skill women’s human capital.  This investment in women is appropriate, 
because these women are best qualified to utilize those resources.5 Compared to low skill 
women, who have fewer community investments in their human capital, high skill are the less 
likely to participate in the paid work force and are less likely to have children to whom they can 
pass on their personal resources.   
Though it is hardly the only reason for this imbalance, the tax system discriminates 
 
1 See generally, Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N. Y. TIMES, October 26, 2003; Claudia Goldin, 
The Quiet Revolution that Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and Family (January 2006) 
(unpublished 2006 Ely Lecture).  
2 Belkin, supra note 1.  
3 Id.; Goldin, supra note 1. 
4 See generally National Center for Health Statistics, Birth and Fertility Rates by Education Attainment, 
United States, 1994, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/mvsr/supp/46-45/mv45_10s.htm. 
5 At least to the extent admission to educational institutions is indicative of future productive potential.
3against working mothers6 and accelerates the departure of high skill mothers from professional 
life.  In addition, recent analysis of the National Youth Longitudinal Study of 1979 (NYLS79) 
indicates that motherhood triggers an arbitrary wage penalty.  So the labor decisions of mothers 
are distorted by inequitable tax policy and discriminatory wage disparities.  This Article argues 
that in order to neutralize the economic impact of parenthood between men and women, and to 
encourage high skill women to fully distribute their human capital in the paid work force and as 
parents, working mothers should be subject to a separate regressive rate schedule.  
First, the Article provides an overview of women’s current labor participation, fertility 
rates, education attainment, and tax treatment.  Next the Article introduces and critiques the 
evidence of wage discrimination in “The Mommy Track Divides: The Impact of Childbearing on 
Wages of Women of Differing Skill Levels” by Ellwood, Wilde and Batchelder (2004) 
(hereinafter, TMTD).  Specifically, the Article explores the tax implications of TMTD’s 
findings.  Finally, in response to this new data, the Article proposes taxing working mothers 
regressively and according to family size to minimize mothers’ paid labor distortions.  
 
I. THE PROBLEM 
A. DISTRIBUTION: THOSE WITH THE MOST ARE DOING THE LEAST 
Women’s labor and education patterns changed dramatically in the last century.7 Many 
factors contributed to the change, including domestic labor demands, wartime labor needs, and 
the women’s liberation movement.  Traditionally women’s labor had higher income elasticity 
 
6 See generally, EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN: HOW THE MARRIAGE PENALTY AFFECTS 
YOUR TAXES (1999).  
7 See generally, Goldin, supra note 1.  
4and lower substitution elasticity.8 In the past, financial need, rather than personal preferences, 
exerted the greatest influence on women’s labor/leisure decisions.  As it became more acceptable 
for women to continue to work absent economic necessity, the income effect decreased and the 
substitution effect increased.9 Today women seek personal satisfaction in addition to financial 
compensation from their careers.10 Although women’s labor supply transformed significantly in 
the 20th Century, it is still substantially more elastic than men’s.  So in the last two decades, 
while women’s labor elasticity halved from .85 to .4, men’s remained fairly constant at about 
.05.11 
As significant as changes in women’s market labor participation are, their educational 
attainment transformed even more dramatically.  In the 1950’s women went to college as much 
to meet a suitable husband as to prepare for a future career.12 Less than ten percent of 
professional degree graduate students were women.13 Today fifty-eight percent of all higher 
education degrees go to women.14 In 2003 women earned sixty percent of associate’s degrees, 
fifty-eight percent of bachelor’s degrees, fifty-nine percent of master’s degrees, and forty-seven 
percent of doctor’s degrees.  This educational attainment reflects women’s burgeoning career 
aspirations.15 Increasingly, women seek an education for their future professional achievement.  
 
8 See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
WOMEN (1990). 
9 Goldin, supra note 1, at 9.  
10 See Gillian Lester, In Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 Harv. J. of L. and Gender 1, at 29 (2005).  
11 See Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn, Changes in the Labor Supply Behavior of Married Women: 
1980-2000, (unpublished National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 11230.  
12 Goldin, supra note 1, at 13.  
13 Goldin, supra note 1, Figure 5: Fraction Female among First Year Students in Professional Progams 
(looking at M.D., J.D., D.D.S., and M.B.A. programs).  
14 See National Center of Educational Studies, 2002-2003 Statistics,
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=72.  
15 Trends in Education Equality of Girls and Women (2004) 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/equity/Section7.asp (“Females currently have greater success than males in 
attaining postsecondary education. Females have higher aspirations than males while in high school, they 
are more likely to enroll in college immediately after graduating from high school, and they persist and 
5Not surprisingly then, women’s majors “shifted from those that were ‘consumption’ related to 
those that [are] ‘investment’ related,”16 i.e. those that lead to future careers.   
Despite these increases in education achievement and labor participation, high skill 
women do not experience equal professional advancement. Women account for just sixteen 
percent of law firm partners and corporate officers; only eight Fortune 500 companies have 
female C.E.O.'s; of 535 members of Congress only seventy-six are women.17 As Lisa Belkin 
wrote in a much-publicized article for the New York Times, women “start strong out of the gate.  
And then, suddenly, they stop.”18 As many of the responses to Belkin’s piece noted, the 
phenomenon she describes is largely limited to high income or high skill women.  These are the 
population for whom the decreased income effect and increased substitution effect are most 
relevant.  The population with the highest human capital investment is falling farther short of 
their professional abilities than their low skill counterparts.  The Belkin article implied that these 
high skill women were leaving the work force to focus on raising children, but this same group 
of women is also the least likely to raise multiple children.  
Among the participants in the NYLS7919, the average college graduate had 1.6 children 
by age forty, compared to high school dropouts who had 2.6 children.20 If high skill women did 
have a child, they were much more likely to wait until the end of their child bearing years to 
conceive for the first time.  Of the college graduates who had children by age forty, roughly a 
 
complete degrees at higher rates than males. More than half of all bachelor's and master's degrees are 
awarded to females.”).  
16 Goldin, supra note 1, at 19.  
17 Belkin, supra note 1. 
18 Id. 
19 The methodology of the NYLS79 will be discussed in the summary of TMTD in the second section of 
the Article. 
20 TMTD at 37, table 1.  
6third waited until they were over thirty to have their first child.21 This, compared to only five 
percent of high school graduates who waited until their thirties to start a family.22 In addition, 
high skill women were significantly more likely than low skill women to be childless at age forty 
(twenty-seven percent of college graduates compared to sixteen percent of high school 
graduates).23 The National Center for Health Statistics24 analysis of all birth certificates in 1994 
also observed the growing tendency of highly educated women to delay or forgo motherhood.25 
A woman’s ability to control the timing of motherhood and limit the size of her family is 
invaluable in ensuring her equal opportunity and choice in making life and career decisions.  At 
the same time, there is a problem for society as a whole when the resource-rich are not having 
children.  There is ample evidence that the children of high skill, high income parents generally 
go to better schools, receive better health care, better nutrition, etc.  These privileged youngsters 
score higher on standardized tests and can afford to seek higher education in the future.  All this 
opportunity and advantage sets them up to pursue high skill, high-income careers themselves, 
presumably passing the benefits they were born into on to another generation.  That flow of 
resources is stymied, because among highly skilled women there is a falling birthrate.  Society as 
a whole rewarded these women for their hard work and talent by subsidizing their education 
(either through public schools, tax credits for tuition payments26 or loan interest deductions27).  
 
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 A division of the Center for Disease Control.  
25 See National Center for Health Statistics, supra note 4.  (Data highlights included the findings that 
“[b]irth rates differ considerably by educational attainment. In 1994 women with 0-8 years of education 
had the highest birth rates overall, while those who started but did not complete college had the lowest.  
Among women aged 25 years and over, unmarried women with less education had a much higher birth 
rate than unmarried women who attended school longer.  For college-educated women, low first birth 
rates for women in their twenties and high first birth rates for women in their thirties point to the 
continuing trend of delayed childbearing.”).  
26 See. e.g., Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits, 26 U.S.C. §25A.
7That investment is underutilized if the recipients are neither continuing to contribute to the 
market economy nor passing on the benefits of the investment to their children.   The tax code 
should be encouraging these high skill women to be as productive as possible, either as 
professionals, as mothers, or both.  Instead it does the opposite.  Rather than mitigate social 
distortions, which cloud a mother’s paid/domestic labor decisions, the tax code tends to amplify 
them.   
B. THE TAX PROBLEM  
The gender bias of the tax code is well documented, beginning with Grace Blumberg’s 
groundbreaking work in Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of 
Working Wives and Mothers.28 Nothing in the code is overtly gendered.  However, because 
women are almost always a household’s secondary earner, and because social norms favor 
women in domestic roles, the tax code contains practical biases.  The current U.S. tax system 
discriminates against working wives in three principle ways.29 First, the non-taxation of imputed 
income combined with societal norms that place heavier domestic labor burdens on women 
encourages women to stay out of the paid workforce.  To demonstrate, compare two couples, one 
whose housework is performed by hired professionals, and another where housework is 
performed by the couple themselves.  The first couple is spending after-tax income on something 
the second couple gets for free.  Also compare two domestic workers, one is a stay-at-home 
parent who takes care of their own children, cleans their own house, and cooks their own meals, 
the second is paid to do the same tasks for someone else.  The first worker is not taxed on the 
completion of their work (which has a value to the family equal to the second worker’s 
compensation), while the second worker is.  These examples were gender neutral, but the real 
 
27 See 26 U.S.C. §163.
28 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 49 (1972).  
29 See generally, MCCAFFERY, supra note 6.  
8life examples are not: domestic workers, paid and unpaid, are predominantly female.30 
The economics of many households are such that the non-taxation of imputed income 
makes it less expensive for a mother to stay home and take care of a family and house, rather 
than to go to work and earn a salary.31 As Edward McCaffery has explained, this tax treatment 
made sense a century ago, when all but the most desperate or most ambitious women did stay 
home.  Today, working mothers are the norm, not the exception, and the distortion to their 
labor/leisure decision is unacceptable.32 The challenge in neutralizing the distortion is that 
imputed income is very difficult to evaluate, and its taxation would be politically unpopular.33 
Recently researchers at “Salary.com” calculated a market valuation for mothers’ domestic 
labor.34 The results were striking: a stay-at-home mother might be earning as much as $134,120 
for her family; the market valuation for working mothers’ domestic labor came to $85,876 in 
addition to her professional salary.  Convincing a majority of Congress to tax a stay-at-home 
mom on a six-figure imputed income is unlikely.  The “Salary.com” calculations were based on 
ten factors, including how much time moms spent driving, cooking, and cleaning.  Even if 
Congress could find the political capital to impose a tax on imputed income, it is unlikely they 
 
30 See David H Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diversity, and the Division of Domestic Labor: How 
Much Have Things Really Changed?, 42 Fam. Rel. 323, 326 (1993); see generally, ARLIE RUSSELL 
HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT (1990). 
31 See, e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra note 6, at 11 (explaining the situation of “women on the margin”).  
32 See Blumberg, supra note 28; MCCAFFERY, supra note 6; and Nancy Stoudt, Taxing Housework, 84
Geo. L. J. 1571 (1996) for more in depth analyses of the problem with non-taxation of imputed income.   
33 Id., at 1618 (proposing a method of imputed-income taxation focusing on “the productive aspects of 
household activities.” Id at 1620).  In the simplest scenario, evaluation of imputed income would have to 
take children, marital status, market participation, household income, and professionally performed 
household activities into account.  Stoudt argues the benefits of quantifying household labor is worth this 
complication as well as the other costs associated with such a reform.  She analogizes her proposal to the 
EITC.  However, the complication of the EITC is very different from the complication of a mandatory 
imputed-income tax.  First, the EITC is a voluntary program.  If a tax payer does not wish to make the 
necessary calculations, they do not need to do so.  Moreover, the EITC provides a substantial benefit to 
those who choose to participate.  In contrast, a tax on impute income would require all households to 
endure the added complications in order to calculate an additional tax (not a new benefit).  
34 http://mom.salary.com.  
9could execute an accurate one given the difficulty and complication of calculating and 
confirming the imputed income.   
 In conjunction with the non-taxation of imputed income, the psychological “stacking” of 
income encouraged by joint filing exacerbates the gender bias.  As with the treatment of imputed 
income, joint filing was introduced into the tax code sixty years ago when only a minority of 
married women worked full-time.35 Like the non-taxation of imputed income, joint filing 
provides traditional families with a tax bonus.  Instead of taxing each earner at their marginal 
rate, joint filing combines household income and then taxes each half equally.  For a two earner 
couple with equal incomes, there is neither a benefit nor a penalty associated with filing jointly.  
For a couple with only one earner there is a benefit.  For example, take Jack Highskill, who earns 
$100,000 and is married to Jane, who has no income.  Their household income will be split and 
taxed as if they were each earning only $50,000.  So Jack’s income is taxed as if he were earning 
half as much and Jane were earning an equal amount.  In a system of progressive tax rates that 
translates to two times the amount of income taxed in the lower brackets.   
The psychological stacking of income refers to the tendency to treat Jane’s income as a 
supplement to Jack’s.  If Jane decides to go to work, her income is taxed starting at the marginal 
rate applicable to $50,000 and above.  So if Jane’s job pays $75,000, the couple’s household 
income is $175,000, taxed as if each spouse made $87,500.  Whatever additional tax is collected 
on the added $75,000 will be thought of as coming entirely from Jane’s salary, when in fact it is 
a product of the spouse’s combined income.  When people conceptualize their tax burden, the 
primary earner’s income is the base of the calculation, with the secondary earner’s income 
stacked on top.  So the view is that the first $100,000 earned by Jack gets the benefit of the 
 
35 See MCCAFFERY, supra note 6, at 45-57 for a brief history of the adoption of joint filing in response to 
the income splitting allowed under Seaborne in community property states.  
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income splitting, but Jane’s earnings are taxed entirely at the higher marginal rates.  This 
characterization reflects gendered thinking, which automatically describes a husband’s income as 
primary, because the wife’s labor/leisure decision is more elastic.  One could just as easily think 
of a wife’s earnings as primary and as enjoying the marriage bonus, while the husband’s is 
stacked above, but since women are socially disfavored primary earners, this depiction is rare.36 
The third major gender bias in the tax code is imbedded in payroll and social security 
taxes.  Because these taxes are effectively regressive37, they discriminate against working 
women, who on average earn less than three quarters of their male counterparts’ salaries.38 In 
addition, because Social Security and Medicare benefits extend to spouses, working wives are 
paying payroll taxes for a benefit they would receive regardless of their contribution.39 The 
combination of regressive payroll taxes, social insurance benefits to unemployed wives, joint 
filing, and non-taxation of imputed income creates a significant disparity in the code’s treatment 
of working and stay-at-home wives.  The over-taxation of working mothers’ paid labor is a more 
powerful influence now than in decades past, because for the first time women’s substitution 
effect is on the rise.  As women choose between career and child rearing not just for financial 
stability but also for personal satisfaction, the undervaluation of their paid labor becomes a more 
important factor in ultimately deciding to stay home.40 
II. THE MOMMY TRACK DIVIDES  
Women are not brining home smaller after tax earnings solely because of an unfair tax 
 
36 See MCCAFFERY, supra note 6, 11-29.  
37 Payroll taxes are flat up to an income threshold, at which point they no longer apply, making them 
effectively regressive.  
38 See Blau & Kahn, supra note 11.
39 See MCCAFFERY, supra note 6, at 89-106.  
40 This is not to say that over-taxation is not also a factor in the labor/leisure decision of women with only 
their family’s financial need to consider.  Rather it will induce such women to work more, not less.  
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burden.  Despite greater education achievement and tremendous growth in workforce 
participation, women are making twenty-five percent less in pre-tax income than their male 
counterparts.41 The effects of motherhood are a primary explanation.  Extended leaves of 
absence from work and compromised time commitments upon return have long been thought 
responsible, along with discrimination, for the continuation of the wage gap.  Scholars surmise 
that because of the constraints motherhood places on working women, there may be a lower 
natural rate of labor force participation for women than for men.42 The contribution of Ellwood, 
Wilde, and Batchelder’s The Mommy Track Divides: The Impact of Childbearing on Wages of 
Women of Differing Skill Levels, is to show how much of the wage gap is the result of the fact of 
motherhood itself, as opposed to the leaves of absence or diminished time commitment that 
childbirth requires.   
A. DATA ANALYSIS 
The Mommy Track Divides presents Elwood, Wilde, and Batchelder’s analysis of the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).  NLSY79 collected responses from 
more than 14,000 individuals, ages fourteen to twenty-one, beginning in 1979 and continuing for 
more than twenty years.  The NLSY79 is a good source for this topic for a number of reasons.  
First, the sample sizes were such that complex regression analysis could still yield statistically 
significant results.  This allows multiple factors, like race and marital status, to control for skill 
level more accurately.  There is one significant exception to this with regard to the oldest women 
in the survey: as the analysis turned to increasingly longer term impacts (more than 10 years) 
there were decreasing numbers of survey respondents to analyze, and so those results are limited.  
In other words, at the time of TMTD only the oldest survey respondents had turned forty years 
 
41 See Blau & Kahn, supra note 11. 
42 See Goldin, supra note 1, at 25.
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old.  The authors were working with increasingly small survey sample sizes as they looked at 
older populations.  The data set was also limited to women who had children after the age of 
twenty-one.43 
The longitudinal study was ideal because it allowed for an analysis of wage trajectories, 
i.e. wages over time, as opposed to static wage gap comparisons.  This is a much more 
meaningful view of the effect of motherhood on careers, because it can follow women many 
years after childbirth to observe possible wage recoveries and the impact of leaves of absence 
and decreased labor force participation.   
In addition, the NLYS79 is a particularly useful data source, because it has already been 
the subject of numerous other scholarly analyses.  This provides Ellwood, Wilde, and Batchelder 
with a starting point and an automatic comparison of methodology and results.  For instance, 
previous studies observed the static impact of childbirth on women’s wages.44 Other work 
further refined those results by introducing educational attainment and age-at-first birth 
variables.45 TMTD expanded on these results.   
Finally, the NLYS79 is an effective data source, because it comes at the right time.  The 
survey sample represents the first generation of women for which this study makes sense.  Born 
between 1958 and 1965, the survey respondents came of age during what Claudia Goldin 
 
43 Because all survey respondents took the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) at the beginning of
the survey, women who either never had children or had children before the age of twenty-one were
excluded from the data set to facilitate age normalization of their AFQT scores.
44 See Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women’s Wages, 62 Am. Soc. Rev. 209-217 (1997);
Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the ‘Family Gap’ in Pay for Women with Children, 12 J. of Econ. Persp.
137-156 (1998); Michelle J. Budig and Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 Am. Soc.
Rev. 204-225 (2001).
45 See Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Jean Kimmel, The Motherhood Wage Gap for Women in the United
States: The Importance of College and Fertility Delay, Dept. of Econ., San Diego State University,
Mimeo (2003); Hiromi Taniguchi, The Timing of Childbearing and Women’s Wages, 61 J. of Marriage &
Fam. 1008-1019 (1999).
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characterized as “the quiet revolution.”46 This was the first generation of women who expected 
to work after marriage.  They were the first to pursue secondary education to prepare for a career 
path.47 This is also the first generation of women in the last century whose labor participation 
growth slowed,48 reflecting the increasing substitution effects at play.  This generation has more 
women on the labor/leisure margin, choosing between career and family.  This is also the first 
generation of women with such high rates of education attainment.  Because of the survey 
sample’s unique position in the story of women’s education and labor participation, it is an 
appropriate subject for a skill-based analysis of childbearing wage effects.  
Within the NLSY79, Ellwood, Wilde, and Batchelder used the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) as an indicator of skill level.49 All NYLS79 survey respondents took 
the AFQT at age twenty-one.  The AFQT tests for verbal expression by evaluating word 
knowledge and paragraph comprehension as well as arithmetic reasoning and mathematics 
knowledge.  The authors used the AFQT instead of higher education as an indicator of job and 
life skills, because it is immune from endogenous changes (higher education may be attained at 
many points in a woman’s life, whereas the skills tested by the AFQT should have been 
substantially developed by the start of the longitudinal survey).50 Once normalized by age, the 
authors divided the AFQT scores into thirds (low, medium, and high skill) for the regression 
analysis.   
The regression analysis of working mothers’ wage trajectories by skill level controlled 
for fixed effects including age of first birth, race, marital status, work interruption, reduction in 
 
46 Goldin, supra note 1 at 15.
47 Id. at 17.
48 Id. at 15.
49 TMTD at 18.
50 The AFQT does have some endogeneity, because the skills it tests can be somewhat influenced by
education, so the scores were normalized by age before they were used in the statistical analysis. See
TMTD at 18.
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hours worked, and change in employer.  In addition to running the regression for working 
mothers of different skill levels, the study also compared the wage trajectories to those of women 
without children and to those of working fathers.   
Generally the methodology behind the analysis is persuasive.  There are, however, 
empirical and logical weaknesses that require discussion.  The authors point out the greatest gap 
in the NLSY79 data: the next twenty years in these women’s trajectories.  While there is no 
reason to suspect they will shift dramatically, even slight movement would change the impact of 
currently insignificant variables.  In particular, the timing of first childbirth among highly skilled 
women, which was found to be insignificant in the current analysis of wage trajectories, could 
prove much more important over a longer period of time.   
The possibility of a development in this particular variable is indicative of a second 
shortcoming in the data.  As already discussed above, there is only limited data on the oldest 
women in the study.  The study did find that highly skilled women are more likely to delay 
motherhood.  However, the study did not find that this delay had a significant impact on wages. 
Because only a small portion of the women in the survey are old enough to have delayed 
motherhood for very long, this conclusion may be a premature one.  Therefore, any conclusions 
the study draws only pertain to the mid-career impact of childbearing.  This period should be of 
primary concern anyway, after all it is the period in which these women are able to have children 
and are embarking on their careers.  This is when they require financial stability to support their 
families.  This is the period in which these women are making the life decisions with which this 
Article is primarily concerned.  So the data limitations are not debilitating. 
B. RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS AND LINGERING QUESTIONS 
Given the methodological soundness of the regression analysis, this Article will treat the 
15
regression analysis outcomes as conclusive.  First and foremost, the study found that 
childbearing lowers a mother’s wage trajectory absolutely.51 This result is not new, but it is 
important to keep in mind that regardless of any and all variables this remained true throughout 
the analysis.  Having children lowers women’s wages.  Moreover, TMTD provides a useful 
explanation for contrary literature, which argue that mothers actually experience a wage increase 
upon childbirth.  This analysis reveals that the surveyed women who never had children were on 
lower wage trajectories to begin with, which explains why other studies had found a motherhood 
wage boost when only comparing the static wages of women with and without children.52 
Though costs of childbearing are felt in the wages of all working mothers, the analysis 
revealed a greater negative impact on high skill women.53 The wage trajectories of low skill 
women are flatter overall than high skill women.54 Intuitively, it makes sense that, since high 
skill women have higher salaries, they have the ability to experience higher childbearing costs.  
Similarly it makes sense that a diminished wage trajectory would be harder to observe in a low 
skill woman making minimum wage with little hope of advancement.  However, the losses high 
skill women experienced were significantly greater relative (i.e. as a percentage of their original 
gradient) to low skill women as well.55 Low skill mothers had wage patterns that were fifteen 
percent lower ten years after having children.  High skill mothers suffered a thirty percent 
decline, or double the penalty, in their wage growth trend in the ten years following their first 
birth. The wage trajectories for these high skill women clearly shift at the age of first birth, and 
rather than mitigating the impact of childbirth on wages, the passage of time only increased the 
disparity between high and low skill mothers.  Low skill mothers typically experienced a “one 
 
51 TMTD at 19.
52 TMTD at 19.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 20.
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time, permanent fall in pay of perhaps [six percent] above and beyond any reduction in pay 
traceable to lost work experience.”56 On the other hand, high skill mothers’ childbearing 
penalty, again above and beyond the impact of decreased working hours, increased over time 
from eight percent to twenty-one percent.   
By controlling for fixed effects, the authors were able to allocate portions of the 
motherhood costs to different variables and rule out others altogether.  So for instance, the 
regression analysis showed that high skill women experience these greater wage losses 
regardless of decreases in work experience or hours worked.  For high skill women there was no 
making up for lost time in later years as their children grew older and they recommitted more 
time to work.57 Although the wage dip cannot be attributed to a decrease in hours worked, it 
clearly does not occur until after birth, eliminating doubt as to the cause of the decrease.58 
Unlike diminished time commitment to work, extended work interruption is a significant 
cause of high skill mothers’ wage penalty.59 Interruption in work and employment may account 
for almost half of the wage losses among affected women.  Therefore, the women with the most 
to lose, like longer tenured women with the greatest firm investment, were far less likely to 
interrupt their careers with extended absences from work.60 All high skill women experienced a 
statistically significant wage penalty from motherhood, only part of which could be explained by 
some mothers choosing to interrupt their careers for child rearing.   
The regression model also controlled for occupation effects, like moving to a part-time 
 
56 Id. at 21.
57 Note that the study only tracks these women into their early 40’s. It may be that a wage recovery occurs 
in their late career.  However, even this argument seems weak, considering how much ground these 
women would have to cover (something along the lines of a thirty percent wage growth rate increase in 
the last half of their professional lives).  
58 TMTD at 21.
59 Id. at 28.
60 Id.
17
schedule or alternate employment for the sake of flexibility and found no real impact from those 
variables.  The wage penalty for mothers who did not take extended leaves of absence, could not 
be explained either by their diminished work hours or by occupation effects.  Nor could the 
impact on working mothers’ wage trajectories be explained by their marital status61, race62, or the 
timing of motherhood.63 This last conclusion is particularly intriguing, since high skill mothers 
consistently wait to longer to have children than low skill women.64 TMTD found that high skill 
mothers of all ages experienced statistically similar wage penalties.  One possible explanation, 
not explored by TMTD, is that a high skill woman’s timing of motherhood is reflective of her 
chosen career path.  Perhaps most women are mitigating their wage penalties by having children 
at their career’s optimal time for interruption.  A future exploration of the problem should focus 
not just on skill level, but also on field of occupation. Another possible explanation is that the 
timing of high skill women’s childbirth may reflect expectations of future labor participation.  It 
may be that younger mothers plan on taking a leave of absence and then returning full time, 
whereas older mothers plan to cut back to part time.  The timing may still reflect women’s 
strategic mitigation of motherhood costs, but because the data is limited to women under fifty, it 
will be a number of years before any such hypothesis can be fully explored.   
In addition to analyzing the cost of motherhood, TMTD also investigated the impact of 
having children on the wage trajectories of high skill men.  Generally fathers did not experience 
 
61 Id. at 28.
62 Id.
63 Analysis of the high skill mother sub-sample, did initially indicate that delaying motherhood could
mitigate the resulting wage cost. However, when the sample of high skill women was separated into two 
data groups, one for younger mothers (twenty-seven and younger at first birth) and another for older 
mothers (twenty-eight and older at first birth) it became clear that each group experienced comparable 
declines in wage trajectories as a result of having children.  See id. at 25.  
64 See National Center for Health Statistics, supra note 4.
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a statistically significant wage penalty at any skill level upon having children.65 Like women, 
those who never had children had consistently lower wage trajectories from the beginning of the 
study.66 This result explains what previous scholars had described as a fatherhood wage boost.   
A less than ten percent decrease (less than a third of that experienced by high skill mothers) in 
wage trajectory could be observed ten years after the birth of a high skill father’s first child, 
indicating that if men do suffer a parenting wage penalty, then like women it is cumulative.67 
Having concluded that reduced work hours, career interruption, firm changes, timing of 
motherhood, marital status, and race cannot account for the full impact of childbearing on high 
skill women’s wage trajectories, the authors leave open ended the question of what does.68 The 
authors suggest a conflict of time commitment to work, not captured by the study, or subtle 
discrimination could be to blame.  Mothers may or may not lessen their commitment to their 
work after having children, but the perception that they do would be enough to dampen their 
wage trajectory as if they had.  
Despite this thorough analysis, the authors under-treat a few seemingly important points.  
First, and most glaring, is the absence of any discussion of income.  For all the discussion of 
mothers’ wage trajectories and their relationship to skill level, the authors never relate these 
central factors to the one most people care about: how much they get paid.  The authors write 
that “[a]n important part of the motivation for this work is the finding that more skilled women 
delay childbearing more.”69 The authors look for variables that could explain the costs of 
childbearing, which in turn may account for the decision to delay motherhood. The authors then 
chose the AFQT, as opposed to endogenous education variables, to measure skill level. What is 
 
65 TMTD at 29.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 30.
68 Id. at 28.
69 Id. at 13.
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implicit in the analysis, but never fully addressed is that both education and skill level are rough 
proxies for income.  High skill, educated women generally come from families with higher 
household incomes and go on to make more money than their low skill peers.  A mother’s 
income suffers from even more severe endogeneity than education.  However, it might be useful 
to see how the timing of motherhood and the childbirth wage penalty are related to grandparents’ 
income.   
A curiosity about the impact of household income (both in a mother’s childhood and 
adulthood) on timing decisions and wage effects leads to two other shortcomings in the analysis.  
The data from the NLYS79 does not include paid family leave or tax burdens.70 Paid family 
leave was not a question in the NLYS79, but perhaps the authors could limit the data to 
Californians, who are guaranteed paid family leave by law, to gleen some insights into its effects.  
NLYS79 did have an income variable, so it would have been possible to incorporate approximate 
tax burdens in the analysis, but the authors of TMTD have chosen not to do so.   
C. TAX IMPLICATIONS  
TMTD explored the wage penalty hoping to provide an economic explanation for the 
motherhood delay.  Such an economic analysis is incomplete without a discussion of tax effects. 
Parenthood wage penalties which do not include tax penalties, understates the distortion on 
working women’s family planning decisions, because tax burdens weigh heavier on working 
mothers than they do on working fathers. 
 Imagine Jack Highskill is thirty years old and makes $80,000 on a wage trajectory to 
make $100,000 in four years.  His wife Jane Highskill is twenty-six years old and makes $64,000 
as a lawyer, on a wage trajectory to make $80,000 in four years.  The tax brackets for a married 
 
70 See The National Longitudinal Youth Study of 1979, User’s Guide, 205 (2006),
http://www.bls.gov/nls/79guide/2002/nls79g4b.pdf.
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couple filing jointly in 2006 are: 
• 10% on the income between $0 and $15,100  
• 15% on the income between $15,100 and $61,300; plus $1,510
• 25% on the income between $61,300 and $123,700; plus $8,440
• 28% on the income between $123,700 and $188,450; plus $24,040
• 33% on the income between $188,450 and $336,550; plus $42,170
• 35% on the income over $336,550; plus $91,043
If Jane were unmarried71 she would owe $12,55872, in taxes.  In four years she would 
owe $16,732 in taxes.  Instead, because she is married, Jane’s income, secondary and stacked 
onto Jack’s, is taxed an additional $16,609.  Four years later, instead of bringing home $63,268 
in after-tax income Jane earns only $58,311 after taxes.  Meanwhile Jack brings home $81,885.  
After taxes the difference between Jack and Jane’s salaries is $3,574 greater than before taxes, 
because Jane is paying a larger portion of her salary in taxes than Jack is.   
 
71 Marginal tax rates for single tax payers for 2006 are as follows:
• 10% on income between $0 and $7,550
• 15% on the income between $7,550 and $30,650; plus $755
• 25% on the income between $30,650 and $74,200; plus $4,220
• 28% on the income between $74,200 and $154,800; plus $15,108
• 33% on the income between $154,800 and $336,550; plus $37,676
• 35% on the income over $336,550; plus $97,653
72 This does not include payroll taxes. For the purposes of this discussion payroll will not be included,
and only basic federal income tax, without deductions will be calculated. In reality payroll taxes place an
unequal burden on secondary earners, so to the extent the discussion here is incomplete, it errs on the side
of conservativism: should the payroll taxes be included, the tax disparity between Jack and Jane would be
increased.
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Salary Tax Childcare Net
Unmarried Jack 
Jane 
Household
$80,000
$64,000
$144,000
$16,732
$12,558
$29,290
$63,268
$51,442
$114,710
Married, Yr 1 Jack 
Jane 
Household
$80,000
$64,000
$144,000
$13,115
$16,609
$29,724
$66,885
$47,391
$114,276
Married, Yr 4 Jack 
Jane 
Household
$100,000
$80,000
$180,000
$18,115
$21,689
$39,804
$81,885
$58,311
$140,196
Married, Yr 4, 1 Child Jack  
Jane 
Household
$100,000
$76,000
$176,000
$18,115
$20,569
$38,684
$10,000
$81,885
$45,431
$127,316
Married, Yr 4, 1 Child, 
Part-time 
Jack 
Jane 
Household
$100,000
$38,000
$138,000
$18,115
$9,929
$28,044
$8,000
$81,885
$20,071
$101,956
Married, Yr 8, 3 Children Jack 
Jane 
Household
$125,000
$91,000
$220,000
$24,404
$28,178
$52,582
$16,000
$100,596
$50,823
$151,418
Married, Yr 8, 3 Children, 
Part-time 
Jack  
Jane 
Household
$125,000
$45,500
$172,500
$24,404
$13,300
$37,704
$13,000
$100,596
$21,200
$121,796
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Now imagine that during those intervening four years Jack and Jane have a daughter, 
Julie. Jane returns to work, while a sitter watches Julie for $10,000 a year.  Jack is making 
$100,000, $18,115 of which will go to the Internal Revenue Service.  Jack is on a wage 
trajectory to be making $125,000 in another four years.  Jane on the other hand is now paying a 
motherhood wage penalty.  Instead of earning $80,000, Jane is on a twenty percent lower wage 
trajectory, so her salary has only risen to $76,000. In the meantime Jane will have to pay $20,569 
in taxes. 73 That, together with the $10,000 in childcare costs, leaves Jane with only $45,431 to 
show for her year’s worth of work.  
The marriage and motherhood penalties on Jane are compounded by the incentives 
created by the non-taxation of imputed income.  Jane may be feeling unsatisfied at work, 
possibly because she’s there full time, but only seeing a fraction of her former earnings actually 
come to fruition.  Also, she’s not getting raises or promotions at the rate she once was.  
According to Ellwood, Wilde and Batchelder this is not because she is working less, but 
probably because of subtle discrimination.  Meanwhile, she is paying a substantial portion of her 
take home pay in childcare costs, while wishing she could spend more time with her toddler.  
Many secondary earners do not earn as much as Jane does, and could actually save money by 
cutting back on work.  Jane will not save money by cutting back, but because her husband also 
makes a high salary, the income effect does not increase her paid labor elasticity either.  For a 
woman in Jane’s position, the substitution effect becomes paramount.  If she wishes she could 
spend more time at home, then she can.  For a new mom juggling a career and a small child, it is 
 
73 Although the new family member will reduce the Highskills’ tax burden as an additional dependent, the
Highskills will not qualify for the child care credits because their income is too high. See 26 U.S.C.§21.
If Jack or Jane’s work participates in the program, they may be able to deduct a portion of their childcare
expenses. See 26 U.S.C. §129.
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easy to imagine wanting less to worry about.  
So Jane decides to cut back on her hours.  The move to part-time work is a slippery slope, 
because the marriage penalty and payroll taxes diminishes the economic contribution of a 
secondary earner.  Jack and Jane will still have to pay for childcare, the cost of which does not 
get reduced in proportion with the reduction in salary Jane will incur by switching to part time 
work.74 And Jane’s tax burden remains disproportionately high because her income tax is based 
on Jack’s high income.  So if Jane switches to working part time, making $38,000, or half her 
previous salary, she  make $47,500 in four years. Jack is making $100,000, still on track to make 
$125,000 in four years.  Jane pays $9,929 in income tax and $8,000 in childcare, leaving only 
$20,071 to bring home from a year’s worth of part time work.  At these wage and tax rates, 
Jack’s raises will eclipse the take home value of Jane’s entire salary in just four years.  If Jack 
and Jane decide to have another child, the cost of the additional childcare will diminish Jane’s 
take home pay even further.  The economic incentives for Jane to keep working are extremely 
weak.  
 
III. PROPOSING A SOLUTION 
A. END JOINT FILING, BECAUSE WE CAN  
As discussed in previous literature and demonstrated in the calculations above, joint 
filing penalizes secondary earners by encouraging the perception of their income as stacked on 
top of the primary earner’s income.  This characterization is not inherent in the concept of joint 
filing.  Despite the fact that most Americans now live in two earner households, the gender gap 
in wages and allocation of domestic work means that the joint filing bias against women is 
difficult to avoid.  Not only would abolishing joint filing simplify the tax code, it would be the 
 
74 Unfortunately day care costs do not decrease significantly when a parent stays home part time.  
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easiest way to change the way couples calculate the costs and benefits of their work.  Shifting 
societal biases toward gender roles directly would be much more difficult.   
Because women’s labor supply remains much more elastic than their husbands’, the 
change from joint to separate filing is likely to have a greater impact on women’s paid labor 
decisions.  Generally, as tax rises and income decreases, women, especially married women with 
children, participate less in the paid labor market.  Men on the other hand have highly inelastic 
labor supplies, so as tax rises and income decreases men continue to work, even increasing their 
paid labor, to compensate for the tax.  This greater elasticity is particularly true with respect to 
high skill women.  Low skill women have higher income effects, and generally do not have the 
option of staying at home full time due to financial pressures.  High skill women have much 
higher substitution effects, and when they decide to have both a family and a career it is for 
personal satisfaction as well as financial stability.  Though these women may not be working out 
of financial need, they are still influenced by basic economics.  The current penalties that joint 
filing inflicts on high skill secondary earners make their labor less valuable to them.  If they are 
choosing between the personal satisfaction of career and income as opposed to time at home with 
family, a lower take home salary will distort the comparison.  The motherhood wage penalty and 
tax biases compound this distortion.   
An alternative to reinstating separate filing, is taxing imputed income.  If imputed income 
is taxed like ordinary income, then the joint filing penalty on women undervalues their domestic 
and marketplace labor equally.75 As discussed in the previous section, it is not clear that a tax on 
imputed income could be implemented effectively.  If it were possible to tax imputed income, 
then it would necessarily involve a number of new complications.  Moreover, it would allow the 
joint filing bias against women’s income to remain.   
 
75 See Stoudt, supra note 32.
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Separate filing therefore is the simplest, most effective method of eliminating gender bias 
in the tax code.   By restoring individual filing, such a reform would also give tax policy makers 
the flexibility to target rate structures to eliminate the wage penalty distortions of mothers’ labor 
decisions.   
B. NEW RATE SCHEDULES 
If shifting from joint to individual filing eliminates the marriage penalty’s economic 
distortion to secondary earners, then the individual rates themselves can focus on eliminating the 
motherhood penalty’s distortion.  By targeting a special rate structure for working mothers, tax 
can neutralize labor supply choices.  Taxing working mothers at low regressive rates reverses the 
motherhood wage penalty.  In addition, tax can subsidize socially desirable behavior.  Increasing 
regressivity with family size encourages high skill families to have more children.  In order for 
the strategy to work, non-mothers and men must pay taxes at progressive rates, because the 
penalties and incentives at issue are all relative to the treatment of men and childless women.  
This heightened progressivity for the majority of taxpayers will also compensate for revenue 
shortfalls caused by mothers’ new regressive rates.76 Such a rate structure breaks down as 
follows:  
 General Individual Marginal Rates 
• 0% on the income between $0 and $20,000 
• 20% on the income between $20,000 and $40,000  
• 35% on the income between $40,000 and $60,000; plus $4,000
• 50% on the income between $60,000 and $80,000; plus $11,000
• 65% on the income between $80,000 and $100,000; plus $21,000
76 Remember that a tax on a generally less elastic population (men and working women with no children) 
raises revenue without significantly distorting behavior. 
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• 80% on the income above $100,000; plus $34,000
 Marginal Rates for a Mother of One or Two Children 
• 25% on the income between $0 and $20,000  
• 21% on the income between $20,000 and $40,000; plus $5,000
• 17% on the income between $40,000 and $60,000; plus $9,200
• 13% on the income between $60,000 and $80,000; plus $12,600
• 9% on the income between $80,000 and $100,000; plus $15,200
• 5% on the income above $100,000; plus $17,000
 Marginal Rates for a Mother of Three or More Children 
• 20% on the income between $0 and $20,000  
• 16% on the income between $20,000 and $40,000; plus $4,000
• 12% on the income between $40,000 and $60,000; plus $7,200
• 8% on the income between $60,000 and $80,000; plus $9,600
• 4% on the income between $80,000 and $100,000; plus $11,200
• 0% on the income between $100,000; plus $12,000
Under such a system, Jack and Jane Highskill experience very different tax burdens once 
they have children.  As long as they remain childless they are treated the same.  In the first year, 
Jack makes $80,000 and pays $21,000 in taxes.  Jane makes $64,000 and pays $13,000 in taxes.  
As a household Jack and Jane make $144,000 and pay $34,000 in taxes, leaving them with 
$110,000 in after tax income compared to just over $114,000 under the current treatment.  A key 
difference is that, because of the adoption of individual filing, Jack and Jane pay the same as a 
household, whether they are married or not.  More importantly, while the new rates do not 
drastically alter the household’s tax, the perception of each earner’s portion of the burden 
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changes dramatically.  Under the current system, Jack appears to be paying less in taxes than 
Jane, even though he earns more.  Under the proposed new rates Jack and Jane’s share of the 
household’s tax are in proportion to their earnings.  There is no longer an unfavorable 
characterization of secondary earnings, because spousal income is no longer stacked.  Over time, 
the difference in the perception of spousal contributions to household income grows.  Under the 
current system the average tax on Jane’s $80,000 salary is more than twenty-five percent, while 
the average tax on Jack’s $100,000 is less that twenty percent because of secondary income 
stacking.  Under the proposed rates Jack now owes nearly thirty-five percent of his salary in 
taxes, and his share of the household tax burden is in proportion to his share of the income.  
Overall, the household’s tax burden has increased, because Jane is still paying just over twenty-
five percent of her salary in taxes.  The tax burden on the Highskills will continue to escalate as 
they earn more income, unless they decide to start a family. 
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Salary Tax Childcare Net
Unmarried Jack 
Jane 
Household
$80,000
$64,000
$144,000
$21,000
$13,000
$34,000
$59,000
$51,000
$110,000
Married, Yr 1 Jack 
Jane 
Household
$80,000
$64,000
$144,000
$21,000
$13,000
$34,000
$59,000
$51,000
$110,000
Married, Yr 4 Jack 
Jane 
Household
$100,000
$80,000
$180,000
$34,000
$21,000
$55,000
$66,000
$59,000
$125,000
Married, Yr 4, 1 Child Jack  
Jane 
Household
$100,000
$76,000
$176,000
$34,000
$11,280
$45,280 $10,000
$66,000
$64,720
$120,720
Married, Yr 4, 1 Child, Part-
time 
Jack  
Jane 
Household
$100,000
$38,000
$138,000
$34,000
$8,780
$42,780 $8,000
$66,000
$29,220
$87,220
Married, Yr 8, 3 Children Jack 
Jane 
Household
$125,000
$95,000
$220,000
$54,000
$11,800
$65,800 $16,000
$71,000
$83,200
$138,200
Married, Yr 8, 3 Children,  
Part-time 
Jack 
Jane 
Household
$125,000
$47,500
$172,500
$54,000
$8,100
$62,100 $13,000
$71,000
$39,400
$97,400
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The most potent impact of the new rates’ on the valuation of Jane’s work is triggered 
when she and Jack have children.  Four years after the model began, if the Highskills had one 
daughter they would pay twenty percent less in taxes than if they did not.  This discount would 
cover all of Jane’s motherhood wage penalty and much of the incurred childcare costs.  More 
importantly, while Jack is in a marginal rate bracket of eighty percent, Jane’s marginal income is 
being taxed at only thirteen percent.  If the Highskills decide that one parent should sacrifice 
career commitment for child rearing, it will be economically more efficient to have Jack cut back 
at work.  This mitigates the social preference for Jane being the parent who compromises career 
for family.77 In this way the new rates are encouraging not only parenthood, but also the 
equitable sharing of the new responsibilities it brings.   
 Because the current social and economic distortions pressure high skill, high-income 
women to have small families and to stay home to take care of them, the proposed rates increase 
the tax benefits to working mothers of multiple children.   With three children and $220,000 in 
before-tax income, the Highskills enjoy more than a twenty percent discount in their taxes 
because of their family size.  This extra after-tax income covers Jane’s wage penalty and a 
significant portion of the Highskills’ childcare costs.  Again this benefit comes to the household 
through the regressive taxation of Jane’s wages, which are subject to a four percent marginal rate 
and are approaching the zero percent bracket.  Meanwhile Jack is still in the eighty percent 
marginal bracket.  Social norms and the economics of the non-taxation of imputed income 
increasingly pressure working women to leave the workforce as they have more children.  
Therefore, the disparity between the costs to the household of Jack versus Jane cutting back at 
 
77 I do not have an economic model demonstrating exactly what social cost is associated with reverse
gender parenting roles. Ideally the new rates should be calibrated so to neutralize this distortion, rather
than reverse its direction.
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work must also increase to mitigate the distortion to Jane’s paid labor supply.   
By increasing the economic value of a mother’s work, the new tax rates exploit modern 
women’s increased substitution effect.  Women are finally working for personal satisfaction.  
Societal biases and unfavorable tax treatment undervalue their paid labor.  By lowering their 
taxes, the new rates increase the economic value of high skill mothers’ paid labor.  The personal 
satisfaction derived from staying home would have to be much higher to induce a high skill 
mother to stay home with her children.  Meanwhile, the benefits a mother takes from her 
participation in the paid workforce only increase as her family grows, while a father’s remain the 
same.  As families like the Highskills have more children and need to spend more time at home, 
the new tax rates neutralize the pressure mothers’ to make the majority of the adjustment.   
C. CRITICISMS 
The politics of enacting a new tax rate schedule are daunting.78 The proposal raises 
marginal tax rates for most taxpayers, and it eliminates the marriage bonus.  Just the economics 
are a difficult political sell.  On the other hand, previous tax reforms which raised the majority of 
voters’ share of tax revenues, have received public support in the past.79 The proposal might be 
unpopular because in addition to raising progressive rates for men and women without children, 
it also imposes regressive rates on poor, working mothers.  So even those who would be in favor 
of higher progressive rates for redistributive reasons would oppose the proposal’s regressivity.  
However, the proposal could be implemented in conjunction with existing redistributive benefit 
 
78 See generally, Daniel N. Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative
Process As Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 130 U. PA. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
79 See Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, 3
Pers. on Politics 15 (2005) (explaining why the 2001 tax cuts, which were correctly perceived as mainly
extending a benefit to the rich, were supported by people of all income levels). One key difference
between this proposal and the 2001 legislation is that this would not extend a benefit to all taxpayers, but
only to those in households with working mothers. If the 2001 plan garnered support because it gave
everyone a tax cut, however small, then the success of that plan does not necessarily support the hope that
there would be success for this plan either.
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programs like the Earned Income Tax Credit and Temporary Assistance (EITC) for Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families to counteract the regressive impact on low-income families.   
Because the proposal removes the marriage bonus, there may also be concerns that the 
reforms discourage marriage.  If the concern is that low-income families, who experience greater 
income effects, will be particularly discouraged, one response might be to remove the marriage 
penalties in the EITC.  A second counterargument to the concern that the elimination of the 
marriage bonus encourages cohabitation is that the proposal is specifically designed to eliminate 
the marriage penalty. To the extent the marriage bonus encourages couples to marry, the 
eradication of the marriage penalty should too.   
 There might also be an equal protection challenge to the proposal, because the tax rates 
are targeted to a specific class of people, i.e. working mothers.  Legally, the equal protection 
challenge is probably not fatal, because the current jurisprudence on the treatment of people with 
children, which applies only rational basis analysis.80 The specter of unequal treatment might be 
a more serious political problem.  As with the response to the marriage incentives argument, 
framing the proposal in terms of its initial goals is crucial.  The genesis of the reform scheme 
was in the unequal treatment of working mothers.  The new tax rates treat working mothers 
differently, because the rest of the world does too.  To the extent the benefit to working mothers 
exceeds the disadvantage they experience because of irrational discrimination, it is encouraging a 
more efficient utilization of communal resources.  These arguments are more convincing 
politically than the ideal of unequal treatment in the abstract.   
 Even if the justifications for the proposal are politically acceptable, there may be further 
concerns that the proposal will fail to accomplish its goals.  Women’s labor supplies are 
decreasingly elastic.  This makes women less influenced by marginal changes.   While this is 
 
80 See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
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true, women are still far more elastic than men.  So a gendered treatment should still have the 
desired impact on behavior, though admittedly to a lesser extent than when women were more 
elastic. The fact that women no longer work purely out of economic need, does not mean they 
are unaffected by economic factors.  Now that working mothers are socially accepted, it should 
be easier to convince them to work with economic incentives.  Women have an increased 
substitution effect, which means that if their work can be valued high enough, they will continue 
their labor participation.   
 There are also enforcement and compliance matters.  The proposal creates new tax 
avoidance incentives.   For example, a small family owned business could divert all income to 
the mothers in the family to incur only the benefits of the new plan without any of its costs.  
Large corporate entities could reduce their male executives’ salaries, and make a practice of 
compensating those executives’ wives for their contributions as “residential assistants.”  For 
revenue raising reasons these possibilities require careful consideration.  However, for the 
purposes of this Article these situations are of lesser concern, because even here the tax rules 
have encouraged a greater valuation of mothers’ work.  Though only a pretext, the reality of such 
schemes is that mothers have more economic power in the household, which encourages an 
equalization of power everywhere else.   
 The discussion of these concerns about political practicality and effectiveness inevitably 
lead to a comparison of the proposed reform to alternative treatments.  In many ways the 
proposal resembles an unlimited childcare deduction, secondary earner deduction, or a tax on 
imputed income.  All these proposals encourage high-income women to engage in paid labor.  
What this proposal offers that the others do not is an explicit recognition of the unique economic 
disadvantages working mothers face.  The tax code discriminates against working mothers 
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without ever identifying them openly.  The response to the unequal treatment of women in 
general, and working mothers in particular, should begin by acknowledging that unequal 
treatment.  The proposal is designed to equalize discriminatory forces in the tax code and in 
society.  Gender-neutral alternatives fail to convey that message as effectively.   
 
CONCLUSION   
High skill mothers’ diminished paid labor participation rates result from a combination of 
complex social and economic factors, which discourage high skill women from having multiple 
children and high skill mothers from working.  To the extent that we unfairly over-tax secondary 
earners, specifically working mothers, through joint filing and the non-taxation of imputed 
income, the tax code can and should be reformed to eliminate those distortions.  In addition, the 
tax code can target working mothers to mitigate the distortions created by other societal 
pressures that leave the brunt of unpaid domestic labor on their shoulders.  By equalizing 
mothers’ and fathers’ paid labor compensation, this tax reform encourages an equalization of 
unpaid labor allocation.    
